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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT GRAHAM, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No, 
Court of Appeals 
No. 910418CA 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED AND THE CASE SHOULD NOT BE 
REVIEWED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
1. Petitioner has not referred the Court to any 
"special and important" reasons for the issuance of writ of 
certiorari as required by Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
2. The history and general statutory scheme of the Utah 
Dramshop Act indicate that the legislature did not intend to 
extend Dramshop liability to social hosts and therefore the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that 
liability under Utah's Dramshop Act does not apply to social 
hosts. 
3. The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly 
determined that the petitioner could not amend her complaint. 
1 
OPINION BELOW 
The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be 
reviewed by writ of certiorari is Sneddon v. Wenkel, filed 
November 25, 1991 (attached in Appendix under Tab No. 1). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (a copy is 
attached in the Appendix under Tab No. 2). Section 32A-14-1, 
Utah Code Ann. (a copy of the statute is attached in the 
Appendix under Tab No. 3). The subject statute was renumbered 
by legislative enactment in 19 90 and is found in current 
volumes of the Utah Code under § 32A-14-101. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Background and Overview 
This case involves a claim for personal injury sustained 
by the petitioner as a result of an automobile accident with 
the defendant John Wenkel. Petitioner also filed a claim 
against the defendant Robert Graham, alleging that he was 
liable under Utah's Dramshop Act for having supplied beer to 
Mr. Wenkel while Mr. Wenkel was in Mr. Graham's home prior to 
the accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
1. On June 22, 1987, Sneddon filed her original 
complaint with the Second District Court, Weber County, 
against defendant John Wenkel. 
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2. On March 30, 19 88, Sneddon filed an amended 
complaint, adding defendant Graham, alleging Dramshop 
liability against him. 
3. Graham filed his motion for summary judgment on July 
19, 1989. 
4. The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor issued a memorandum 
decision granting Graham1s motion for summary judgment on 
September 26, 1989. Thereafter, an order was entered 
dismissing the complaint of Sneddon against Graham on November 
3, 1989. (See Appendix Tab No. 4.) 
5. On or about November 8, 1989, Sneddon and defendant 
Wenkel entered into a settlement agreement and a release was 
executed releasing the claims of Sneddon against the defendant 
Wenkel. Subsequently, on February 14, 1990, an order 
dismissing the claims of Sneddon against Wenkel was filed. 
6. In late November, 1989, Sneddon filed a motion to 
amend her complaint to add a common law negligence claim 
against defendant Graham and also filed a notice of appeal of 
the summary judgment in favor of Graham. Since an order had 
not yet entered dismissing the claims of Sneddon against 
defendant Wenkel, the dismissal of defendant Graham by summary 
judgment was not a final and appealable order and therefore 
Sneddon's initial appeal was dismissed. 
7. Sneddon filed a second motion to amend her complaint 
on January 23, 1990. The trial court denied Sneddon's second 
3 
motion to amend her complaint, which order was entered April 
13, 1990 • (See Appendix Tab No. 5.) 
8 • Having settled with the defendant Wenkel and an 
order dismissing the claims of Sneddon against defendant 
Wenkel having been entered in February, 1990, Sneddon then 
filed a notice of appeal following the denial of her motion to 
amend in April, 1990. 
9. This matter was heard before the Utah Court of 
Appeals and an opinion was filed November 25, 1991. (Opinion, 
Appendix Tab No. 1.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 25, 1986, Wenkel and Graham got off of work 
at approximately 11:00 p.m. and each traveled in their own 
vehicle to a nearby 7-Eleven store where they each separately 
purchased some beer. (Graham Depo. at 14; Wenkel March, 1988 
Depo. at 13.) 
2. From the 7-Eleven store, Wenkel and Graham then 
traveled in their own separate vehicles to Graham's residence. 
3. Upon arrival at Graham's residence, Wenkel and 
Graham put their beer into Graham refrigerator. (Wenkel 
March, 19 88 Depo. at 13; Graham Depo. at 17.) 
4. Wenkel and Graham then spent the evening talking and 
drinking the beer they had purchased. Although Graham would 
dispute that Wenkel ever consumed any of Graham's beer or that 
Graham ever knew Wenkel had consumed any of Graham's beer, for 
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purposes of the summary judgment motion, and on appeal, Graham 
will assume that Wenkel consumed the beer that Wenkel had 
purchased plus two cans of Graham's beer since that was the 
recollection of Wenkel. (Wenkel June 27, 1989 Depo. at 13; 
also see Court of Appeals Opinion Re: Background Facts, p. 
1.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
PETITIONER HAS NOT REFERRED THE COURT TO 
ANY "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASONS FOR 
THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS 
REQUIRED BY RULES 46 AND 49 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
The character of reasons set forth by petitioner as 
questions and the basis for request for review by writ of 
certiorari do not give this Court any "special and important" 
reasons why the decision of the Court of Appeals should be 
reviewed. 
The questions and reasons for review listed by the 
petitioner ask for a determination whether the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment and in denying the 
petitioner's request to amend her complaint for a second time. 
The petition fails to articulate "special and important 
reasons" why the Supreme Court should review the decision of 
the Court of Appeals. Rather, the petition is a repeat of the 
arguments presented to the Court of Appeals which were 
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rejected. Therefore, this Court should not grant the writ 
petitioned for. 
POINT II, 
THE HISTORY AND GENERAL STATUTORY SCHEME 
OF THE UTAH DRAMSHOP ACT INDICATE THAT 
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO EXTEND 
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY TO SOCIAL HOSTS AND 
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT 
OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
LIABILITY FOR SOCIAL HOSTS DOES NOT ARISE 
FROM SAID ACT. 
The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the history of 
Dramshop statutes in Utah in coming to its determination that 
the legislature did not intend the Dramshop statute to apply 
to social hosts. (See footnote no. 1, Court of Appeals 
Decision, Appendix Tab No. 1.) 
The original Dramshop statute in 1981 premised liability 
based upon supply of liquor contrary to the requirements of 
other referenced sections of the code, including § 32-7-14 and 
§ 32-7-24. A comparison of the present act (32A-14-1) with 
the 19 81 act establishes the clear intent that the present 
statute applies only to commercial context settings. 
In the 1981 act, liability was imposed upon any person 
supplying alcohol to a person already under the influence of 
liquor (§ 32-7-14) or any person who permits drunkenness to 
take place in any house or on any premises who suffers any 
person under the influence of alcohol to consume liquor in any 
house or on any premises or who gives liquor to any person 
under the influence of liquor (§ 32-7-24) (emphasis added). 
6 
The legislature overhauled the previous Liquor Control 
Act with the "Alcoholic Beverages Control Act" which repealed 
the Dramshop Act of 19 81. The new Dramshop Act in effect at 
the time pertinent to this case was found at § 32A-14-1 (now 
renumbered as § 32A-14-101). Prior references in the repealed 
statute to "permit drunkenness to take place in any house 
. . ." or to permit a person under the influence of liquor "to 
consume any liquor in any house . . . " were repealed and not 
found in the new Dramshop statute. The new Dramshop statute 
at § 32A-14-1 effective in 1986 provides that: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, 
or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the 
premises, any alcoholic beverages, to 
a person: 
(a) Who is under the age of twenty-
one (21) years, or 
(b) Who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products 
or drugs, or 
(c) Whom the person furnishing the 
alcoholic beverage knew or 
should have known from the 
circumstances was under the 
influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products 
or drugs, or 
(d) Who is a known indicted person, 
and by those actions causes the 
intoxication of that person, is 
liable for injuries in person, 
property, or means of support to any 
third person, or to the spouse, 
child, or parent of that third person 
7 
resulting from the intoxication. An 
employer is liable for the actions of 
its employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under 
Subsection (1) has a cause of action 
against the person who provided the 
liquor or alcoholic beverage in 
violation of Subsection (1). 
(Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Ann. 
1986, now renumbered as § 32A-14-
101. ) 
Notably absent from the statute in force at the time of 
this incident are references to "house". As noted by the 
Court of Appeals, the legislature has not used the word 
"house" or "private residence", rather the word "premises" is 
used in the statute. 
In Traylor Bros. Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 
1048 (Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals discussed 
statutory interpretation and stated that: 
. . . the intent of the legislature is 
revealed in the use of the term in the 
context and structure in which it is 
placed. Consequently, omission should be 
noted and given effect. (Quoting from p. 
1052. ) 
The Dramshop Act premises liability upon "any person who 
directly gives, sells or otherwise provides . . . " alcoholic 
beverage at a location allowing consumption on the premises. 
As noted by the Court of Appeals, person is defined in the 
Alcoholic Beverages Control Act. (See Court of Appeals 
Decision, p. 4, Appendix Tab No. 1, quoting from § 32A-1-
5(27).) 
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The definition of person in the Alcoholic Beverages 
Control Act evidences a business or commercial context. The 
definition provides that person is "any individual, 
partnership, firm, corporation, association, business trust, 
or other form of business enterprise including a receiver or 
trustee, . . . " 
The definition of person is clear that it is meant to 
address a "form of business enterprise". (See also Court of 
Appeals Decision, pp. 4, 5, Appendix Tab No. 1.) 
In the Alcoholic Beverages Control Act, the word 
"premises" is also a defined term. The definition does not 
include the word "house" or "private residence". (See Court 
of Appeals Decision, pp. 4, 5, Appendix Tab No. 1.) 
The Court of Appeals Decision that the Dramshop Act does 
not apply to individuals in a noncommercial social setting is 
also confirmed by the legislative history of the Dramshop Act 
that is the subject of this case. From the legislative 
history, Senate Bill 182, day 38, February 19, 1986, Disk No. 
83, the legislative history provides in part that: 
This bill extends the Dramshop 
Act, not only to people who are selling 
liquor, but it also extends it to people 
who are selling beer if that beer is 
consumed on the premises.... 
Senator Cornaby: Mr. President, the 
original theory and the prevalent theory 
under the Dramshop Act in all of the 
states that I am aware of as well as in 
Utah to date has been that a Dramshop 
owner—a bar owner who has a person 
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sitting in his establishment—drinking 
and the bartender is in a position to 
observe the demeanor of that person while 
that person is drinking, has an 
opportunity to determine when that person 
has had enough and can say to that person 
Ifm not going to sell anymore and if that 
person is sold something more and goes 
out and causes an accident, then 
(inaudible) Dramshop owner or bartender 
is liable. . . . 
The current law only goes to 
liquor, the current law does not go to 
beer. This bill — one of the things 
that this bill does and one of the 
tradeoffs that was made in working this 
bill out was to include the sale of beer 
-- not only liquor, but beer -- in to 
this law, so the current law does not 
have beer in it. This includes beer. 
But only if the beer is sold to be 
consumed on the premises, so that you're 
selling it at a bar — you're selling it 
at a function where the person handing 
the drink to someone will be able to 
observe that person rather than the 18-
year-old checker or the 19-year-old 
checker that's at a grocery store that's 
handing the beer to them. . . . 
POINT III. 
THE MAJORITY OP OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT 
HAVE CONSTRUED DRAMSHOP STATUTES HAVE 
HELD THEM TO APPLY TO COMMERCIAL CONTEXTS 
AND NOT TO SOCIAL SETTINGS. 
Other jurisdictions when confronted with Dramshop 
statutes similar to Utah's have determined that they are not 
intended to apply to social settings. In Fabian v. Polish 
American Veterans, 466 N.E.2d 1239 (111. App. 1984), the 
Illinois Appellate Court reasoned that: 
The Dramshop Act was intended to regulate 
the business of selling, distributing, 
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manufacturing and wholesaling alcoholic 
liquors for profit, . . • 
To impose liability on the association in 
the instant case would make no 
distinction between those engaged in the 
liquor business for profit and those who 
hold social gatherings where liquor is 
dispensed. (Quoting from p. 1241.) 
Heldt v. Drei, 455 N.E.2d 842 (111. App. 1983), 
determined that the Dramshop Act applied only to commercial 
contexts even though the act used the word "giving". 
In Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1985), the 
Missouri Court of Appeals stated that: 
The obvious intent of the 
legislature is the control of liquor 
licensees in the dispensing and sale of 
alcohol. In the context of the entire 
act and its stated purposes, the apparent 
intention is to regulate the commercial 
sale of liquor, not its use in a social 
setting. (Quoting from p. 22 3.) 
In a later case, the Missouri Supreme Court in Childress 
v. Sans, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1987), held that the Dramshop Act 
did not apply to a social setting where the guests had made a 
contribution to defray the expenses of the alcohol. The court 
noted that: 
No commercial motive is evident. We find 
that Sands and Hulsey were social hosts 
and that under the Harriman rule adopted 
in Audres, the trial court properly 
sustained the motion for summary 
judgment. (Quoting from p. 50.) 
In D'Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y. 1987), the 
New York court construing its Dramshop statute that imposed 
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liability upon anyone "unlawfully selling to or unlawfully 
assisting in procuring liquor for" refused to extend liability 
to social hosts and stated that: 
While not literally restricted to actual 
"Dramshops" or commercial taverns, the 
Dramshop Act has consistently been read 
by lower courts as applicable only to 
sales of liquor for profit — that is, 
commercial sales • . . . We find no basis 
for departing from the consistent 
interpretation of lower courts that the 
Dramshop Act requires a commercial sale 
of alcohol. (Quoting from pp. 89 8 and 
899, citations omitted.) 
See also, Smoyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 
So.2d 585 (Ala. 1987). 
A decision which points to compelling policy reasons for 
not extending Dramshop liability to social hosts is Burkhart 
v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759 (Wash. 1988). In the Burkhart case, 
the Washington Supreme Court noted some of the many practical 
problems which attend the imposition of Dramshop liability on 
social hosts: 
Opponent stressed the potential 
substantial financial liability that 
social hosts would face, as well as the 
heavy burden that would be placed on 
social hosts to regulate guests1 alcohol 
consumption. This duty to regulate the 
drinking of others would raise a series 
of problematic questions for social 
hosts. How is a social host, 
inexperienced at judging the extent to 
which others have been intoxicated, to 
decide the course of his own actions? 
Must the host determine if a quest has 
been drinking before arriving at the 
party? Can the host determine if a guest 
is drinking on an empty stomach? What if 
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a guest is taking prescribed medication 
or using illegal drugs? Must the host 
count the number of drinks that each 
guest consumes? Is it necessary to gage 
a guest's weight and height in order to 
determine allowable amounts of alcohol? 
May guests be allowed to mix their own 
drinks, or should the host tend the bar 
himself to monitor consumption? Must the 
host refrain from drinking in order to 
better supervise the guests? Must the 
host determine which of its guests will 
be driving home? Before guests depart, 
should the host conduct sobriety tests, 
asking them to recite the alphabet or 
walk a straight line? If an intoxicated 
guest insists on driving home, how far 
can the host go in preventing him from 
doing so? Must he offer to pay for a 
taxi or put the guest up for the night? 
As one court has noted, the implications 
of social host liability are almost 
limitless. (Quoting from p. 760.) 
On page 11 of petitioner's brief, the case of Kelly v. 
Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984), is cited for the 
proposition that liability should apply to social hosts under 
Dramshop Acts. Petitioner has mislead the court in citing 
that case for the proposition stated since the state of New 
Jersey did not have a Dramshop statute at the time of the 
Kelly decision and the case only deals with the proposition of 
a decision by that state's court that under certain 
circumstances, a duty can arise to a social host. Later in 
this brief, defendant Graham will address the fact that the 
majority of jurisdictions faced with a request to extend 
common law liability to social hosts have declined to do so in 
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addition to those states that have declined to extend Dramshop 
liability to social hosts, 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT. 
A. The Petitioner's Motion to Amend Was Properly Denied 
Given the Age of the Complaint, the Development of 
Discovery, the Dismissal of Sneddon's Complaint Against 
Graham, and the Consequential Prejudice Graham Would Have 
Suffered if an Amendment Had Been Permitted. 
Some two months after the trial court granted Graham's 
motion for summary judgment, the petitioner moved to amend her 
complaint to allege a common law Dramshop theory against 
Graham. By the time petitioner had moved to amend her 
complaint, her case was well over two years old. The trial 
court had already permitted amendment of the complaint twice 
before the motion which was denied. Graham had moved for and 
obtained summary judgment. 
As recognized by the Court of Appeals in its decision on 
page 5 (see Decision, Appendix Tab No. 1): 
We will not disturb a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to amend a complaint 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 
(Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah Power and 
Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
Although the Court of Appeals noted that there was some 
ambiguity in the trial court's order concerning the reasons 
why the motion to amend was denied, the Court of Appeals noted 
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that the decision was supportable for two reasons. First of 
all, the decision is supportable based upon timeliness. On 
pages 6 and 7 of the Court of Appeals decision (see Appendix 
Tab No. 1) after citing to authorities speaking to denials of 
motions to amend made late in the case, the Court of Appeals 
stated on page 7 of its opinion that: 
In the present case, Sneddon sought to 
amend her complaint more than two years 
after the filing of her original 
complaint. The trial court had already 
granted her leave to add Graham as a 
party after the action was filed. When 
Sneddon again moved the court for 
permission to amend, the case was set for 
trial later that month. We believe that 
it would almost certainly be prejudicial 
to Graham to allow Sneddon to amend her 
complaint to add an entirely new cause of 
action at such a late date, in the course 
of the proceedings. Accordingly, we 
cannot say that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying Sneddon's 
motion. 
The second basis to support the denial of the motion to 
amend is grounded in the trial court and Court of Appeals 
determination that no common law cause of action arises in the 
context of a social host/guest situation. 
In footnote no. 2 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals on 
page 9 of the opinion (Appendix Tab No. 1) stated that: 
2. Sneddon also urges us to recognize a 
common law action of negligence in 
the context of a social host, an 
issue which had not been addressed in 
the courts of this state to date. 
However, we note the Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315, which states 
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that no duty can be found to protect 
another from harm unless and until a 
special relationship exists between 
the parties. See Beach v. University 
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) 
(Supreme Court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of defendant where 
plaintiff failed to show affirmative 
duty existed on part of defendant to 
protect plaintiff from harm.) No 
such relationship has been 
established between Sneddon and 
Graham. 
Although it is not necessary to determine whether there 
is in fact a common law Dramshop cause of action in Utah to 
analyze the issue of whether or not the trial judge abused his 
discretion in denying Sneddon's motion for leave to amend, the 
following citation to cases from other jurisdictions supports 
the conclusion of the trial court and Court of Appeals as an 
alternative basis for sustaining the decision denying leave to 
amend. 
Research of the cases from other jurisdictions that have 
addressed this issue show that the clear majority have refused 
to extend a common law cause of action in favor of a person, 
injured by an intoxicated person against a social host who 
furnished alcohol to the intoxicated person: Arizona — 
Keckonen v. Robles, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. App. 1985); 
Connecticut — Slicer v. Quigley, 429 A.2d 855 (Conn. 1980); 
Illinois -- Heldt v. Drei, 455 N.E.2d 842 (111. App. 1983); 
Mississippi — Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 S.2d 526 (Miss. 
1985); Missouri — Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 
16 
1985), Childress v. Sans, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1987); Montana — 
Runge v. Watts, 589 P.2d 145 (Mont. 1979); Ohio — Suttlemyer 
v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, 464 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 
1984), Pennsylvania — Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507 (Pa. 
1983); South Carolina — Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 
345 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. App. 1986); Tennessee — Cecil v. Hardin, 
575 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1978); Texas — Walker v. Childrens1 
Services, Inc., 751 S.W.2D 771 (Texas App. — Amarillo 1988); 
Washington — Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 458 P.2d 
897 (Wash. 1969). 
The above-cited cases employ three basic rationales in 
refusing to recognize such a cause of action: (1) As a matter 
of law, it is not the furnishing or providing of the alcoholic 
beverages, but the consumption, which is the proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries; (2) a social host owes no duty to 
the injured third party because no special relationship exists 
between the social host and the intoxicated guest or the 
social host and the injured third party, which is necessary 
for a duty to arise; and (3) public policy considerations show 
that the differences between commercial and social providers 
of alcohol are crucial and numerous. An imposition of 
liability upon the social host should be undertaken by the 
legislature, which has the resources necessary to fully 
evaluate the situation and establish proper law. 
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DATED this day of f^^r~<A^*^
 r 1992. 
M. Belnap 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Respondent Graham 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant Robyn Lynn Sneddon appeals from the trial court's 
grant of appellee Robert Graham's motion for summary judgment, 
and the trial court's denial of her motion to amend her 
complaint. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
This case arose out of an automobile accident which occurred 
on April 25, 1986, where Sneddon was injured when the automobile 
operated by John Wenkel collided with Sneddon's vehicle. Graham 
and Wenkel had each purchased approximately a six-pack of beer on 
their way home from work on April 24, the night before the 
accident. At Graham's home, Graham and Wenkel consumed the beer 
that had been purchased. Although the facts are in dispute as to 
who drank which beer, for purposes of this appeal, the parties 
agree that Wenkel consumed the six cans of beer he had purchased, 
and consumed two of the beers that Graham had purchased. The 
following morning Wenkel left Graham's home and collided with 
Sneddon's vehicle, which was parked in her driveway. 
Sneddon filed her original complaint naming only Wenkel as 
defendant in June of 1987. In March of 1988, Sneddon added 
Graham as a codefendant, claiming that under Utah's Dramshop law, 
he knew or should have known that Wenkel was under the influence 
of alcohol and was negligent in letting him drive in that 
condition. Graham filed a motion for summary judgment which the 
trial court granted on November 3, 1989. The order dismissed all 
claims against Graham, with prejudice. In late November, Sneddon 
filed a motion to amend her complaint to add a common law 
negligence claim against Graham, and also filed a notice of 
appeal of the summary judgment in favor of Graham. 
Graham moved the supreme court to dismiss Sneddon's appeal 
because there were still claims pending against Wenkel, and 
therefore, there was no final order from which Sneddon could 
appeal. In December, the parties stipulated to a remand of the 
appeal to the trial court to obtain a final order, and the 
supreme court granted the motion to dismiss the premature appeal 
in January 1990. 
The trial court denied Sneddon's motion to amend her 
complaint, stating that it lacked jurisdiction. No final order 
denying this motion was signed. In January of 1990, Sneddon 
again moved the trial court to allow her to amend her complaint 
to add a common law negligence action against Graham. Prior to 
the court ruling on this motion, Sneddon and Wenkel reached a 
settlement agreement and all claims against Wenkel were dismissed 
on February 14, 1990. The trial court then denied Sneddon's 
second motion to amend her complaint and a final order denying 
the motion was entered in April 1990. 
Sneddon appeals the trial court's summary judgment against 
her, claiming that, contrary to the trial court's legal 
conclusion, Utah's Dramshop law, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 
(1986), applies in a social setting. Sneddon also appeals the 
trial court's denial of her motion to amend her complaint, 
claiming that such an amendment would not have prejudiced Graham, 
and that a common law action of negligence under these 
circumstances should be recognized in this state. 
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY 
In reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we 
must construe facts in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion. Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 
623, 624 (Utah App. 1991). "Summary judgment can [only] be 
granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 
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623 (citations omitted). "Because the trial court's ruling on 
the meaning of a statute presents a question of law, we review it 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
conclusion." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court granted Graham's motion 
for summary judgment, stating that Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 
(1986) was not intended to apply in a social, as opposed to 
commercial, setting. Chapter 14 of the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act (hereinafter the Dramshop Act) establishes liability 
for injuries resulting from the intoxication of an individual. 
It states in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, 
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or 
at a location allowing consumption on the 
premises, any alcoholic beverage, to a 
person: 
(a) who is under the age of 
21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under 
the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs or 
(c) whom the person 
furnishing the alcoholic beverage 
knew or should have known from the 
circumstances was under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known 
interdicted person, . . . 
is liable for injuries in person, 
property, or means of support to any 
third person, or to the spouse, child, or 
parent of that third person, resulting 
from the intoxication. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1986). Sneddon claims that the broad 
language of the Dramshop Act, as well as public policy, supports 
extending liability to social hosts. Graham argues that the 
language of the statute and its legislative history indicate an 
intent to extend liability only to the commercial setting. 
"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent." 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 
1988). However, when the language is ambiguous, we may attempt 
to discern the intention of the legislature. P.I.E. Employees 
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Fed, Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988), "A 
statute is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably well-
informed persons to have different meanings." Tanner, 799 P.2d 
at 23 3, While Sneddon urges us to find to the contrary, because 
several of the terms utilized in the Dramshop Act are defined 
elsewhere in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Utah Code Ann, 
§§ 32A-1 to -17 (1986), we hold that section 32A-14-1(1) is not 
ambiguous. 
For example, "person" is defined as "any individual, 
partnership, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or 
other form of business enterprise, including a receiver or 
trustee, and the plural as well as the singular number, unless 
the intent to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by the 
context." Section 32A-l-5(27). "Liquor" is defined to 
specifically exclude any beverage defined as a beer "that has an 
alcohol content of less than 4% alcohol by volume," section 32A-
1-5(17), while "alcoholic beverages" "means Abeer' and liquor' 
as the terms are defined in this section." Section 32A-1-5(1). 
"Premises" is defined as "any building, enclosure, room, or 
equipment used in connection with the sale, storage, service, 
manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products, 
unless otherwise defined in this title or in the rules adopted by 
the commission." Section 32A-l-5(29). 
When the principal provisions of the Dramshop Act are read 
in context with the definitions provided by that Act, it is not 
ambiguous. The statute7s plain language explicitly limits 
liability to persons who provide alcoholic beverages "at a 
location allowing consumption on the premises[.]" Conspicuously 
absent from the definition of "premises" is the word "house" or 
"private residence." See section 32A-1-5(29).* 
1. Sneddon urges us to overlook this omission, arguing that the 
legislative history of the Dramshop Act indicates it was intended 
to regulate not only the sale and distribution of alcohol, but 
the possession and use of alcohol in a social setting as well. 
We disagree. 
The legislative history of the Dramshop Act underscores this 
interpretation. The original Dramshop Act statute, added to the 
Intoxicating Liquor Code in 1981, imposed liability upon any 
person who "gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating 
liquor to another, contrary to subsection 16-6-13,.1(8)(d), 
subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1), section 32-7-14 or subsection 32-7-
24(b) or (c) . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1981) 
(repealed 1985). The sections referred to in the statute 
provided for the imposition of liability upon persons supplying 
alcohol to "any person under or apparently under the influence of 
(continued...) 
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We decline to accept Sneddon's arguments, and affirm the 
trial court's legal conclusion that the Dramshop Act does not 
apply to individuals in a noncommercial social setting. 
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
amend a complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion. Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah Power & 
Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App. 1987). 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for 
amendment of a complaint 
once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served 
or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. 
1. (...continued) 
liquor," Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-14 (1966) (repealed 1985), or upon 
persons who "permit drunkenness to take place in any house or on 
any premises of which he is the owner, tenant or occupant; or (b) 
permit or suffer any person apparently under the influence of 
liquor to consume any liquor in any house or on any premisesf,1 
. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-24(a)-(b) (1966) (emphasis added) 
(repealed 1985). 
In 1985, Title 32, Intoxicating Liquors, was repealed and 
replaced by Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. An 
amended version of the Dramshop Act was enacted and codified as 
§ 32A-14-1 (1986), and amended versions of §§ 32-7-14 and 32-7-24 
were enacted and codified as §§ 32A-12-9 and 32A-12-21 (1986). 
The amended Dramshop Act makes no reference to other sections of 
the Alcoholic Beverage Code. Instead, the prohibited acts are 
included in the Dramshop Act statute itself. The words "house," 
or "private residence" do not appear in any of the amended 
statutes. Only the word "premises" appears in §§ 32A-12-21 and 
32A-14-1. 
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In denying Sneddon's motion to amend, the trial court 
stated: 
The court having previously granted 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and having entered summary judgment dated 
November 3, 1989, dismissing the 
complaint of the plaintiff with 
prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion 
to Amend Complaint to "add a cause of 
action against the defendant, Robert 
Graham, based upon a theory of common law 
negligence in supplying intoxicating 
liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel." 
Having reviewed the motion, and the 
memorandum in opposition to the same, and 
having heard the argument of counsel 
together with the procedural posture of 
the case, with the court having 
previously dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint, and the court having indicated 
at the time* of hearing that if it is 
deemed appropriate at the procedural 
juncture of this case to move to amend 
the complaint, the court is of the 
opinion that there is not a common law 
cause of action .running in favor of a 
person injured against a person who 
supplied alcohol, nor does the court 
believe that the provisions of Utah's 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act affords a 
plaintiff a cause of action under the 
facts and circumstances of this case 
It is unclear whether the trial court denied Sneddon's 
motion because it felt it was inappropriate given the procedural 
posture of the case, because it had no jurisdiction to amend a 
complaint that had been dismissed by summary judgment, or, as 
Sneddon contends, because the court was of the opinion that a 
common law negligence cause of action could not be-raised given 
the facts of the case. 
A. Timeliness of Sneddon's Motion to Amend 
Graham argues that the trial court properly denied Sneddon's 
motion to amend her complaint because of the age of the initial 
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complaint, the development of discovery, the dismissal of 
Sneddon's claim against Graham, and the potential prejudice to 
Graham. 
"In considering a motion to amend, the trial judge must 
decide 'whether the opposing side would be put to unfavorable 
prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not 
time to prepare.'" Kelly, 746 P.2d at 1190 (quoting Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). In Kelly, the 
plaintiff sought to add two defendants more than three years 
afte>- the case was initiated. This court concluded the trial 
court acted within its discretion in denying the plaintiff's 
motion to amend her complaint, reasoning that it was unfair to 
expect the defendants to be prepared to defend an additional 
action at such a late date. See also Westlev v. Farmer's Ins. 
Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (since amendment 
to complaint would have delayed trial and substance of new 
allegation was known to plaintiff a full year earlier, no abuse 
in denying motion). 
In the present case, Sneddon sought to amend her complaint 
more than two years after the filing of her original complaint. 
The trial court had already granted her leave to add Graham as a 
party after the action was filed. When Sneddon again moved the 
court for permission to amend, the case was set for trial later 
that month. We believe that it would almost certainly be 
prejudicial to Graham to allow Sneddon to amend her complaint to 
add an entirely new cause of action at such a late date, in the 
course of the proceedings. Accordingly, we cannot say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying Sneddon's motion. 
B. The Order of Dismissal as to Graham as a Final Adjudication 
As to whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain 
Sneddon's motion to amend, Sneddon argues that the summary 
judgment in favor of Graham did not become a final judgment until 
the court entered its order denying Sneddon's motion to amend her 
complaint, on April 16, 1990. Sneddon incorrectly argues that if 
the dismissal of her claims against Graham was not a final order 
so as to permit appeal, then it was not a final order so as to 
prevent the trial court from granting leave to amend her 
complaint. 
An order that does not wholly dispose of a claim or a party 
is not final, and therefore not appealable. Pate v. Marathon 
Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership v. Hallr 751 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 1988). A 
trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment which 
does not dispose of all claims of all parties, and which has not 
been certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,, is not a final judgment for 
purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Steck v. Aaqaire, 789 P.2d 
708 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). Rule 54(b) states: 
When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is 
no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties 
shall not terminate the action as to any 
of the claims or parties, and the order 
or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and 
the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
As Sneddon asserts, the dismissal of her claim as to Graham 
did not wholly dispose of her case. There were still claims 
pending against Wenkel. Therefore, while the supreme court may 
not have had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal where the trial 
court had not entered a final judgment as to both Graham and 
Wenkel, see, e.g., A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991), the trial court 
continued to have jurisdiction until all claims had been settled. 
The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on Sneddon's motion to 
amend her complaint, and it exercised that jurisdiction in 
denying the motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, both the trial court's grant of 
Graham's motion for summary judgment, and the denial of Sneddon's 
motion to amend her cgKi©lain£, are affirmed.2 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
iS_ </ 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory**. Orme, Judge 
2- Sneddon also urges us to recognize a common law action of 
negligence in the context of a social host, an issue which had 
not been addressed in the courts of this state to date. However, 
we note the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315, which states that no duty can be found 
to protect another from harm unless and until a special 
relationship exists between the parties. See Beach v. University 
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (supreme court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff failed to show 
affirmative duty existed on part of defendant to protect 
plaintiff from harm). No such relationship has been established 
between Sneddon and Graham. 
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Tab 2 
Rule 15, Amended and supplemental pleadings, 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A*party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Tab 3 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale 
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages — 
Injured person's cause of action against intoxi-
cated person or persons who provided alco-
holic beverage — Survival of action. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or 
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, 
to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or 
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for 
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to 
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxica-
tion. An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of 
this chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action .against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic bever-
age in violation of Subsection (U. 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the 
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that 
person's estate. 
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person 
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the 
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate 
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one 
occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which 
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within 
two years after the date of the iryury. 
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
History: C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, $ 1; 1986, ch. 177, $ 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective March 17, 1986, added the 
language in Subsection (1) following "or oth-
erwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a) 
through (l)(d), the last sentence in Subsec-
tion (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); in-
serted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the 
beginning; in Subsection (2), inserted "or 
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor 
stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effec-
tive date of this subsection," referred to in 
Subsections (4) and (5), appears in Laws 
1986, ch. 177, § 3, which became effective 
March 17.1986. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WENKEL and 
ROBERT GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
The parties agree that for purposes of this motion, the 
conduct complained of arose in a social as opposed to a 
commercial setting. 
The Court is persuaded that the statute in question is 
not intended to apply in a social setting and accordingly grants 
defendant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this Jf) day of September, 1989. 
t RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
\ 
Case No. 870999559 
\ 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT 
GRAHAM, 
Defendants. 
— — — • — — • • ' ' i 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 99559 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the 
defendant Robert Graham's Motion for summary Judgment. The court 
having reviewed the memoranda submitted in support of the motion 
and in opposition to the motion, and having issued its Memorandum 
Decision determining that the statutes in question were not 
intended to apply in a social setting as found in this case, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant 
Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that 
the plaintiff's complaint against Robert Graham is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant Granam. 
DATED this _J day of Af/wkSUX d kJL*^  , 1989, 
BY THE COURT: 
Mz it&nton M. Taylor 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this^JT^ day of /y-Jj/t-$<>,_ / , 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing summary Judgment 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Erik M. Ward 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
P. 0. BOX 1850 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
o ^ 
V 
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Tab 5 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
Brett G. Pearce, #5220 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Robert Graham 
sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, | 
V. 
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT 
GRAHAM, 
Defendants. 1 
) ORDER 
1 Civil No. 870999559 
Judge Stanton Taylor 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 12th 
day of March, 1990, at the hour of 10:45 A.M. before the 
Honorable Stanton Taylor, District Court Judge, on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Complaint. 
The plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record 
and defendant Robert Graham was represented by his counsel of 
record. 
The court having previously granted Defendants Motion 
for summary Judgment and having entered its Summary Judgment 
dated November 3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff 
with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend complaint 
to "add a cause of action against the defendant, Robert Graham, 
based upon a theory of common law negligence in supplying 
intoxicating liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel." 
A proposed amended complaint was not presented with the 
motion, but counsel for plaintiff presented argument as to the 
basis for the amended complaint. 
Having reviewed the motion, and the memorandum in 
opposition to the same, and having heard the argument of counsel 
together with the procedural posture of the case, with the court 
having previously dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, and the 
court having indicated at the time of the hearing that if it is 
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to 
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that 
there is not a common law cause of action running in favor of a 
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol, nor does 
the court believe that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act afford to the plaintiff a cause of action 
under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
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p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion to Amend Complaint i s denied,. 
DATED t h i s /„ 7 day of 1990. 
D i s t r ^ t /Sour" 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 3c ™~ day of /JldA^^L^ , 
1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Erik M. ward 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
riuicL ,/^ c.j fiyf-c_ 
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